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HOW MEXICO IS MEETING REHABILITATION
PROBLEM-PENAL INSTITUTIONS PRAISEDCOURTS EFFICIENT
By ROSALIND GOODRICH BATES, of the Los Angeles Bar

M

ANY of the changes in the Mexican penal system have
proven of decided interest to both lawyers, criminologists, and students of social sciences. The problem of
rehabilitation is being met in the republic south of the Rio
Grande in an effective manner. It is truly amazing that the
Latin people, with their emotionalism, should be able to reconstruct the social viewpoint of the criminal more effectively
than the Anglo-Saxon. An examination of the records of
the three major federal penitentiaries shows a healthy condition not found on this side of the border.
How has Mexico given a new social viewpoint to the
individual who is guilty of a "Crime of Blood"? These
crimes include common assault, assault with a deadly weapon,
manslaughter, and murder.
The Mexican Federal Penitentiary, of easiest access to the
American lawyer and judge, is located in the heart of the City
of Mexico. The building itself covers two city blocks. In
its center is the women's prison. With minor differences, the
management of all of the federal penitentiaries is the same.
This particular penitentiary has a population of about 3,000.
Nine hundred of these men and women are employed in trades
in the penitentiary.
There are eleven departments of work, and the prisoner
judged physically able by the medical board is given the opportunity to earn his own expenses, make reparations to those
he has injured, and support his family on the outside. As a
result of this policy, the prisons are self-supporting, costing
the government and the taxpayer nothing. The wages earned
that are sent out of prison in no case average over $14 a week.
As most of the prison inhabitants are of the lower class, $12
115
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will buy enough beans and corn to feed a wife and three or
four children.
TRADES ENCOURAGED

Although the Mexican trade unions are in some respects
better organized than those in our own country, they do not
protest against the work done by prisoners. One of the public
defenders, Miss Esperanza Valesquez Bringas, who was my
guide in the Mexico City prison, stated, "If we can teach the
men who have committed crimes to become useful citizens,
they will no longer be a burden on the taxpayer. If they
cannot earn a living when they go out of here, then they will
come back in a short while. Both labor and capital realize
that supporting men in idleness in penitentiaries makes them
unemployable and produces more crime."
The Federal Government is very proud of the printing
department, where the forms of the Supreme Court are produced. Modern linotype machines are operated by prison
labor. There were only two civilians assisting in the entire
department. The work of the courts, and forms for other
departments of the government, are made efficiently by prisoners.
One would expect to find an elaborate furniture division. The beautiful hand-carving of the Mexican artists is
known the world over. Entire sets of furniture are made by
prisoners. If the man is accomplished in the trade, he is allowed to perfect himself. If he has only begun his work as
a carpenter, he is taught all of the elements that will finally
produce a master craftsman. Heavy machinery departments,
where the work necessary to maintain other government
building is done, are quite interesting. The weaving of materials is a successful prison industry.
ART DEPARTMENTS

Besides the prisoners who report daily to each of the
eleven work divisions, there are several hundred men who
spend their time in purely artistic endeavors. The government as yet has not forced the artists into labor of all kinds.
Beautifully woven horsehair baskets, exquisite ivory crucifixes, and dainty clay manikins are made and sold from all
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the Mexican prisons. The work departments are not complete. Many more machinery divisions are planned during
the coming year.
The actual sanitation of the prison is quite a problem
that has been solved by removing the men from their cells and
putting them into the open during six or eight hours a day.
There are recreation grounds where prisoners are taught
to play games and another department where they are urged
to learn the use of the shower bath. Educational facilities are
not only provided, but enforced. No man or woman, regardless of the offense, is allowed to leave the penitentiary until
they have learned to read and write. In a nation where illiteracy claims such a big percentage, this is a decided step forward.
The prison ideal is physical cleanliness, as well as mental and
spiritual.
MURDERESSES' CLUB

The center of the prison, containing the women's quarter, is much more attractive than that of the men. The very
hub of the building is occupied by what is known as the Murderesses' Club, composed of seven women who are confined
for having eliminated their husbands and lovers by direct
action. Each individual cell has its tiny garden where the
occupant may raise either flowers or vegetables. The prisoners' children may visit once a week and frequently remain
overnight.
MATRIMONIAL HOUSE

One of the amazing features of Mexican prisons is the
lack of the strange, unnatural tension that one feels in any
Anglo-Saxon house of correction. The men seem to go
about their work with a normal attitude of mind. There are
no sullen, glaring, stifled expressions that one sees too frequently in American prisons. This difference, the head of the
prison explained to me, is due, in his opinion, both to the
gainful occupation of the prisoner, and to the matrimonial
house. In the latter institution, the wives of the inmates are
allowed to visit. The guards admitted that it was not customary to peruse too closely the marriage license. While we
could get no definite information as to the number of women
who remained faithful to felons, the records seem to indicate
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that the majority of the wives did not divorce their erring
mates, but waited for them. The Matrimonial House, with
its allowance of a visit once a week, or sometimes once in two
weeks, undoubtedly plays its part in keeping the family together.
THE JUVENILE COURT

American lawyers who speak the language are given
every courtesy in the courts of Mexico. There is no citizenship requirement and the Mexico City bar has quite a list of
American advocates. Even the American lawyer and judge
with no knowledge of the language will be given courteous
attention. But it would not be possible for the American
lawyer who does not speak Spanish to handle legal matters in
the republic effectively.
The Juvenile Court in the Mexican Federal District has
proven of great interest to Americans. The court sits en banc
and is composed of three judges. Only one of the three is a
lawyer, the other two being members of the teaching and medical professions. One of the three must be a woman. Usually
the feminine member of this court comes from the teaching
profession. The theory back of all Juvenile Court procedure
in the Republic of Mexico is that something in the child's
environment is unsatisfactory and must be changed. A complete survey is made of his whole surroundings and his physical condition.
METHOD OF COURT APPEALS

Mexican appeals are taken on the original papers, which
cuts the cost very materially. If the attorney is diligent, the
case may proceed from the lowest to the highest court of the
land in six or seven months. The Supreme Court, where the
matter is finally adjudicated, is composed of twenty-one members. The Chief Justice is the administrative officer of the
entire Mexican federal judiciary. There are four Salas or
departments, the penal, civil, administrative, and labor divisions. Each department has five judges who meet each day
of the week except Monday, when the whole court sits en
banc. From its birth in 1824, when the Supreme Court of
Justice was born, until the present date, many of the most
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distinguished presidents of the republic and literary men have
been a part of this court.
The present Chief Justice, Daniel V. Valencia, is said to
be one of the finest administrative officers who has ever presided over this body. The court is at present turning out over
six thousand opinions a year. Much of the work is handled
through the secretary, Attorney Francisco Pereda Gay. Mr.
Gay's history of the Supreme Court of Mexico was published
in 1929 and is yet untranslated. It reviews briefly all of the
important changes in the republic.

ANNUAL MEETING OF AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION
All indications are that previous attendance records of
the American Bar Association will be exceeded at the Boston
convention during the week of August 24. With an attractive program being developed and the important plans for a
better national organization of the bar up for consideration
amid historic New England surroundings, the prediction is
made that this will be an outstanding and dynamic meeting of
American lawyers. Many lawyers have made known their
intention to take their vacations in New England with their
families, either before or after the Association meeting. Graduates of New England colleges and universities are taking this
opportunity of revisiting their alma mater, and the Harvard
men are looking forward to the Harvard tercentenary anniversary celebration, which will take place early in September.
Many historic shrines of old New England, as well as
charming mountain and seashore resorts, are within easy motoring distance of Boston, and will constitute an added attraction for those attending the meeting. Detailed information
will be sent soon to all members of the Association. Hotel
reservations should be made at once by all those who are
expecting to attend. Lawyers who are not members of the
American Bar Association but who wish to attend and vote
at the convention, should apply for membership promptly.

"JUST WHAT IS YOUR DEFENSE?"
By JUDGE GEORGE T.

McDERMOTT*

The judicial quality does not reside in form or ceremony, still less in circumlocution and an avoidance of the pitli of the matter. The judicial quality of procedure is
found in the impartial bearing and the reasoned determination upon ascertained facts,
and it may be speedy, summary, and, as our clients would say, businesslike, without
losing its character.---Charles E. Hughes.

UITE by accident, and in blissful ignorance of the
English practice act, I stumbled onto a method of get-

ting at the nub of a case at the beginning of the litigation instead of at the end of it, while in the practice. It
seemed to work, and I tried it out on the bench, and it has
worked well there in the few cases where the play has come
up. That method corresponds closely, I am told, to the
English practice. I see no reason why a rule requiring a few
minutes' face-to-face conference between, the parties, their
counsel, and a trial judge, within a few days after a case is
filed, shouldn't extend the practice to all cases in this country.
I hope the United States Supreme Court will give it serious
consideration when the new rules for law cases are promulgated.
I first came onto the idea in some strike lawsuits brought
to cloud the title to producing oil leases. When oil is struck,
a few lawyers start combing the records to find some technical
flaw in the title-flaws not visible to the naked eye. For
fifteen dollars a suit could be started, and the pipe line companies, not unwilling to hold money in escrow without interest, would not pay for the oil while the title was clouded by
litigation. Plaintiff's counsel never dreamed of winning; he
did know the lessee couldn't drill without getting pay for his
oil; so he figured, too many times correctly, the lessee would
pay a substantial sum to release the pipe line runs.
How could the defense lawyers meet that? After ineffectually fumbling around on such cases, some Kansas lawyers
struck upon the idea of filing an answer the day after the
summons was served, and at the same time they served notice
on plaintiff's counsel of a motion for immediate trial, setting
out the irreparable damage flowing from the delay. That
brought the parties face to face with the trial judge immediately. The trial judges in the oil country recognize a strike
*Of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. *Reprinted
from Journal of the American Judicature Society.
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lawsuit on sight. When plaintiff's counsel appeared on the
motion, within ten days after he brought his suit, he was put
to the rack of the questions, "Just what is your claim?" and
"Why not try it next week?" These queries ended his effort
to use the process of the court for extortion.
Shortly after I went on the district bench, a fine lawyer
wanted an ex parte restraining order to stop the demolition
of some fifty-odd temporary buildings used in constructing a
massive project. Serious damage would flow from either
granting or denying the order, if the first guess was not the
final outcome. A telephone call brought defense counsel in a
few minutes; an around-the-table discussion narrowed the
dispute to ten buildings, and to a simple question of fact; an
agreement was reached that the buildings in dispute would be
torn down last; a trial of the fact question was set for the following week, and the case was over before the wrecking crew
reached the buildings in controversy.
Then we got into the three-judge cases, the bane of a
circuit judge's life. The statute properly demands quick
action; there is never any notice to the distant judge except a
telephone or wire to come now. The statute contemplates a
trial on the preliminary injunction and another on final hearing. Nobody likes to take two bites at a small cherry. So in
our circuit, the judges have been advising counsel to be ready
to try their cases out when the temporary injunction comes
on for hearing, generally about ten days from the filing of the
suit. Some of them kicked against the pricks at the start.
But we'd ask them, "Just what is your claim?" and then
"Just what is your defense. They all knew, and on their feet
they'd tell us. In a very few minutes the nub of the controversy would develop. At times we permitted answers to be
filed, incorporating the defenses stated in court, after the trial.
The Supreme Court has affirmed one such case and did not
suggest that such procedural informality denied anyone due
process.
After a while the lawyers came to expect it, and answers
were ready when the court assembled. We've had a lot of
three-judge cases in five years; only once, I think, has there
been two trials. In nearly all-I think all but one-the case
was finally tried on the application for temporary injunction.

122

DICTA

Among them have been rate cases with volumes of testimony
-a case involving gas rates to 141 towns in Kansas, and the
Denver Stockyard Case-and cases involving far-flung questions of law, as the proration cases from Oklahoma. As far
as we can see, the cases were as thoroughly tried then as if the
trial had been held a year later. At least no one has complained of the lack of a fair hearing.
Some of our district judges have used the same tactics in
single judge cases. On applications for restraining orders,
made when the case was filed, counsel on both sides have been
called in that day or the next. Such a conference has uncovered the real dispute; has discovered whether the bill has too
much or too little in it; has developed the claim and the defense; and very often has set the case for trial.
If that practice works-and it has-in cases where restraining orders are asked, why won't it work in all cases?
You'd be surprised how many dilatory motions to make definite or to strike out can be disposed of by such a conferenceeven before they are filed. A lawyer with a trumped-up case,
unless it is a case founded on perjury, doesn't want to stand
up and tell it to the judge. A defense lawyer with no weapon
but delay has a bad half hour in such a conference. And in
bona fide controversies, it shortens immeasurably the time for
its solution to get at the crux of the case ten days after it is
filed, instead of in the court of appeals two years later.
Of course, if no lawyer brought a hold-up suit; if no
lawyer made a sham defense; if all lawyers wanted to get the
case decided as quickly as possible, such a rule would be unnecessary. But until that day dawns, such a rule tends to
"smoke 'em out."
In the last analysis, the efficiency of our judicial system is
going to depend on men and not on rules. No football coach
ever won a conference title at a rules conference. He wins it
on the field with men. If the bench and bar were all perfect,
any rules would work. But it's a practical world, and the
law business is intensely practical. We must play with the
cards that are dealt us. And as long as we have sham suits
and fake defenses, and as long as some lawyers and judges are
indolent and dilatory, we must have rules that serve to prod
them along.

BRAVE DAYS IN WASHOE*
By ALBERT HILLIARD**
HE meeting of October 22nd was of unusual interest to
the membership. Various persons contributed their
share of information about an old Nevada case: On July
31, 1908, one Patrick Dwyer, along about dusk of that day,
on the streets of Austin, Nevada, made an unfortunate mistake. Not so unfortunate as far as he was personally concerned, but his blunder on that evening resulted in other
blunders or errors that could have been, and nearly were, the
legal ruination of a district judge and a district attorney.
In this there was one fortunate man, one O'Brien, and
the most unfortunate of all, a railroad conductor, who, by the
greatest of all misfortunes, greatly resembled, in half light, the
aforesaid one O'Brien. At least he did to Dwyer. Whether
he would resemble one O'Brien to others is moot, because on
the said July 31, 1908, Dwyer shot and mortally wounded
A. C. Williams, the railroad conductor, on the theory that he
was one O'Brien. And because of bad marksmanship, or just
general recklessness, he shot, but did not kill, Henry Dyer,
Lander County Recorder, who was strolling with Williams.
Patrick Dwyer had neither ever seen nor even heard of Williams or Dyer.
Feelings in Lander ran high against Dwyer. It made
little or no difference to the citizens that Dwyer had blundered, and had shot Williams and Dyer only because of the
uncertain light. They could not get his somewhat selfish
viewpoint, and without too much ado, tried and promptly
convicted him before a home-town jury in Lander County.
The case was vigorously prosecuted by the District Attorney,
A. J. Maestretti, before District Judge Peter Breen. Dwyer
was defended by P. A. McCarran, present United States
Senator.
*This article is part of one printed in I Nevada State Bar Journal 18, therein
entitled "Typical Sessions of the Washoe County Bar." The others are not so good.
Washoe is the name of Nevada's principal county. At one time all of Nevada constituted Washoe County. Utah Territory.
**Albert Hilliard is the Judge's other son. The Judge's other son (author of
these footnotes---Ed.) says that his brother's profession is that of practicing what they
call law in Reno.
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After this conviction, Senator McCarran, having lost a
case, came to the immediate conclusion that there had been a
miscarriage of justice. A client of his had been convicted.
There must be something terribly wrong with a law like that,
and he was eminently correct, as will be seen. He respectfully
demanded a change of venue on the ground that everybody in
Lander had concluded prior to the trial that a fellow like
Dwyer, who ran around shooting railroad conductors and
county recorders, whom he didn't know, should be removed
from circulation.
Judge Peter Breen, sitting in the District Court of Lander, failed to agree with defendant's counsel. He would grant
no change. He was very positive about it. However, the
Supreme Court could detect some degree of prejudice in Lander County against the defendant, and granted the change,
whereupon the trial was had in Elko County, George S.
Brown, judge.
Sometime after the removal to Elko County, Judge
Breen, in the following classical language, paid his respects to
the Supreme Court in his comments upon that tribunal's
written opinion in granting the change of venue. It was, said
Judge Breen, speaking in the record, "* * * an abnormally
strange document * * * and *** it was highly reprehensible
for its author, or authors * * **" At this point the jurist
feared, if fear was in the man, which seems doubtful, that
maybe to speak of the Supreme Court as in any way reprehensible was skating on pretty thin ice, so he fixed it up by
saying, "I say reprehensible-as a modification I shall say
reprehensible if the court knew what it was doing, pitiful if it
did not." As may easily be imagined, the Supreme Court
failed to view Judge Breen's "modification" as bona fide modification. So they disbarred him. The district attorney, who
had somewhat agreed with Judge Breen, drew a suspension.
But these penalties never took effect, so all was well in the end.
This leaves us with A. C. Williams dead, with Henry
Dyer in the hospital, the judge disbarred and the district attorney out of active practice, all because of the astigmatism of
Patrick Dwyer!
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So what happened to Pat? Exactly nothing. He was
acquitted in his trial at Elko. Why, is not very clear, except
perhaps that he had an "ould mither."
It is most interesting to note that at this meeting when
the above matters were discussed there were present Mr. A. J.
Maestretti, the aforesaid district attorney, now a leading
member of the Washoe County bar, Mr. Henry Dyer, now
out of the hospital, Judge George S. Brown, and Mr. C. A.
Cantwell, who had been a witness at the first trial in Lander.
For complete details of the above see: Nevada vs. Dwyer,
29 Nev. 421 ; In the matter of Peter Breen, 30 Nev. 164.

GEMS FROM THE LAST BAR EXAMINATION
From New Jersey State Bar Association Quarterly
Question-Can a husband in an action against his wife for divorce
on the ground of adultery, swear to non-access where the wife has borne
a child?
Answers-The testimony of the husband showing that he had not
had access to his wife since months before the normal period of gestation
should properly be admitted where a child has been born.
The court should and will take judicial notice of such common
natural phenomenon. In tort law this condition would be termed res
ipsa loquitur.
One spouse cannot testify in an action against the other to a crude
defect in the marital relationship.
Where children are born out of wedlock there is a conclusive presumption of legitimacy.

An allegation in a petition for absolute divorce on the ground of
cruelty was "That suit has not been brought within six months next
preceding the last act of cruelty."
On a question of estate limited over if first taker dies unmarried
and contingent remaindermen die before first taker; the following procedure was outlined:
(1)
The only thing that can be done is to ask Pheobe to get
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married and let her and her husband sign the deed, which I would not
advise simply to give a good title.
(2)
Notice could be given to unborn children by publication.

Venue may be changed because of the impartiality of the judge and
jury.
Testimony given by a party at a previous trial is inadmissible
unless the party is dead and cannot testify.

WHAT WOULD YOUR ANSWER HAVE BEEN?
The following questions and answers were extracted from the examination papers at a recent Michigan Bar examination:
Question involved enforceability of infant's executory contract to
marry accompanied by seduction in reliance thereon. Applicant thought
the contract could be enforced because of partial performance.
In holding against liability of a vendor for misrepresenting important facts relating to the land sold, applicant said: "And while this is
no ordinary-puffing-about all the defendant actually did was to lie
about it."
In treating of a divorce question where the husband was charged
with adultery but the wife, unknown to the husband, had likewise been
guilty of adultery-applicant said: "As a pure matter of barbershop
law-what he didn't know didn't hurt him."
Another applicant said: "The decree should be for the husbandone act of adultery on his part is not sufficient."
In Constitutional Law one applicant defined the system of "Checks
and balances" as that which enabled the President of the United States
to check over the accounts and balances of the government to see which
way it was running.
Another remarked that the trouble with that. system was "too
many checks and no balances." (From Detroit Quarterly.)

INSURANCE-FRATERNAL-FAILURE TO PAY ASSESSMENT-WAIVER

-PRESUMPTIONs-Neighbors of Woodcraft vs. HildebrandtNo. 13713-Decided February 10, 1936--Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland.
Hildebrandt brought suit to recover upon a fraternal benefit certificate in which he was named the beneficiary, which was issued to his
wife. At the close of all the evidence both parties moved for a directed
verdict, whereupon the court discharged the jury and found the issues
joined in favor of plaintiff.
1. Where the insurer over a period of time accepts payments of
assessments that are delinquent, such custom and practice is sufficient to
establish a presumption of waiver by the insured as to prompt payment
of the assessments.
2. Such presumption of waiver of prompt payment is rebuttable.
3. Where the presumption of waiver arises, the burden is upon
the insurer to overcome the presumption.
4. Where the evidence shows that the insured did not rely upon
the custom of waiver of prompt payment and had abandoned her policy,
such presumption is overcome by the affirmative acts of the insured.
5. Evidence of insurer shows a compliance with Section 76 of
Insurer's Constitution, requiring the notification by the grand clerk to
any member of the association who was delinquent.
6. In this case the contract of insurance, or certificate, being that
of a fraternal benevolent society, is the implied embodiment of the insured's application for membership, the charter and by-laws of the
society, and the statutes under which it is organized.-Judgment
reversed.
AUTOMOBILES-LIABILITY POLICY-DUTY OF INSURED AS TO COOPERATION-SHAM ANSWER-FRAUD--COLLUSION-Bagley vs.

Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Company-No. 13279-Decided
February 10, 1936--Opinion by Mr. Justice Butler.
Bagley sued Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Company on an automobile liability policy. An automobile driven by Bagley collided with
another automobile and Bagley, his wife, his daughter Sylvia, and one
Dora Rogoff, all occupants of the Bagley automobile, were injured.
Sylvia, the daughter, sued her father for damages and recovered judgment for $10,000, whereupon Bagley sued the casualty company for
$5,000, the amount of the policy. The case was tried to the court
without jury. The court rendered judgment for the defendant.
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1. Fraud is never presumed, but must be established by evidence
that is sufficient to overcome the presumption of good faith.
2. There is no contention that Bagley deliberately caused the
accident, pursuant to a plan to collect money from the insurance carrier.
The automobile driven by Bagley was on the wrong side of the road
and there the collision occurred. His daughter was injured. Bagley
refused to verify the answer drawn by the defendant's attorney; but his
refusal was justified, for if he had verified that answer, he would have
committed perjury.
3. When a person takes out liability insurance, he does not make
the insurance company the keeper of his conscience, or become a mere
puppet in its hands; nor is he relieved from his obligation not to swear
falsely. Bagley offered to verify an answer so drawn as to state the
truth, but his offer was refused.
4. There was no fraud perpetrated or attempted. There was no
fraudulent collusion with his daughter or her attorneys; no assumption
of liability within the meaning of the policy and no interference with
the legal procedure within the meaning of the policy. Bagley did not
prevent the defendant from raising any honest issue in the damage suit.
5. There was no collusion between the father and daughter, nor
was there a failure to cooperate with the insurance carrier.--Judgment
reversed.
OF INFORMATION---SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE-Papas vs. The People-No. 13835-Decided February
10, 1936--Opinion by Mr. Justice Young.
Papas was tried and convicted of perjury in the District Court of
Pueblo County and sentenced to the penitentiary for a term not less
than one year nor more than 18 months.
1. Helen Lombardi was charged in the district court of Pueblo
County with having committed the crime of aggravated robbery in that
county. One of her defenses was an alibi. Papas testified for the defendant that she was in Denver working in his restaurant on the day
the robbery was alleged to have been committed in Pueblo County. He
was asked on cross-examination if he had not stated in substance to
three officers in Denver that Helen Lombardi was not in his restaurant
all day on the day of the commission of the crime. He denied that he
had made such statements to them. All of the officers testified that he
did make such statements.
2. If Papas knowingly falsely testified under oath that he did not
so state to the officers, he falsely swore to a fact material to the issue
under investigation, namely, his credibility as a witness in the trial of
Helen Lombardi. Nor did the materiality of such statement depend
upon whether Helen Lombardi was or was not in fact in Denver at the
time she was charged with committing a crime in Pueblo.
3. The point in question was his credibility and previous statePERJURY--SUFFICIENCY
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ments inconsistent with his testimony on the trial were material and
admissible for consideration by the jury in determining what weight, if
any, should be given to his testimony.
4. To be material to the issue, the matter need not be on the
primary issue raised by the plea or involved in the case.
5. A witness may be guilty of perjury, not only by swearing
corruptly and falsely to the fact which is immediately in issue, but also
to any material circumstance which legitimately tends to prove or disprove such fact; or to any circumstance which has the effect to
strengthen and corroborate the testimony upon the main fact.
6. Information examined and held to be sufficient.
7. The evidence supports the conviction.-Judgment affirmed.
Mr. Justice Holland and Mr. Justice Hilliard dissent.

WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS-MISJOINDER-DEMURRER---SUFFICIENCY OF COMPLAINT-The Reorganized Catlin Consolidated

Canal Company, et al. vs. The Sunnyside Park Ditch Company,
et al.-No. 13656-Decided January 27, 193 6--Opinion by Mr.
Justice Holland.
The plaintiffs, for different ditch companies operating separate
canals, sought to enjoin the defendants from diverting water from the
Arkansas River and its tributaries, claiming that such diversion was an
invasion of their decreed priorities of right to the use of such water.
Demurrer to the complaint was sustained and the complaint dismissed
upon plaintiff's election to stand upon their complaint as amended.
1. Generally, parties with separate and distinct claims held in
severalty, cannot join in seeking injunctive relief, but there is some flexibility of this rule aimed generally at the prevention of multifarious
litigation.
2. Where it appears that the plaintiffs seek the same character of
relief against defendants who have a general, common defense, and
whose acts are alleged to be performed by more than one of them and
the acts of the defendants would injure the plaintiffs in the same manner by interfering with a common, but similar, right of plaintiffs and
where the defendants each have a community of interest, which ultimately affects all of the plaintiffs and the defendants, such interest being
directly connected with the subject-matter of the controversy, such several plaintiffs may join in an action against such several defendants.
3. To avoid misjoinder it is not necessary that each defendant or
each plaintiff be immediately interested in the whole subject of litigation, but it is sufficient if all the matters in the complaint have a relation to the other matters therein contained, provided the object of the
complaint is single and that it presents a right general to all the plaintiffs, which is alleged to have been invaded by all the defendants.
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4. It is not necessary, in order that all plaintiffs may join all
their causes of action against all the defendants, in an equity suit, that
the complaint allege concert of action on the part of the defendants or
that an alleged design or common plan be followed by unity of action.
-Judgment reversed.
MECHANIC'S LIEN-WAGES-CONTINUANCE--JURY TRIAL-CROSS
COMPLAINT-No. 13870-The Tiger Placers Company vs.
Fisher-Decided January 20, 1936--Opinion by Mr. Justice
Hilliard.
This was a suit for wages and foreclosure of mechanic's lien.
Judgment was given as prayed and error is assigned. Fisher, employed
by The Tiger Placers Company, alleged that a certain sum was due him
for labor performed in aid of which he filed statement of lien, seeking
to charge therewith a dredge boat and other property of the company.
As assignee of ten like claims he made similar allegations.
1. The court did not abuse its discretion in refusing continuance.
2. Where the complaint is in equity and the cross complaint is
filed for damages, neither party was entitled to trial by jury. The complaint fixes the nature of the suit and by what arm of the court it should
be tried.
3. A dredge boat is subject to a lien for wages.
4. Where laborers are working directly for the owner of the
property, time for filing lien statements does not commence to run until
the completion of the work on which they are engaged.
5. Where the lien statement consists in part of expense and in
part for wages, the expense can be regarded as compensation under the
lien act.-Judgment affirmed.

MUNICIPAL

CORPORATIONS-

TAXATION-

WARRANTS

ISSUED IN

EXCESS OF ANTICIPATED FuND-No. 13639- Georgetown vs.
Bank of Idaho Springs-DecidedJanuary 20, 1936--Opinion by
Mr. Justice Holland.
The bank, as assignee of one hundred eighty-six of the town's
warrants, brought this suit to recover money judgment against the
town and judgment was entered in favor of the bank for $6,320.24,
the full amount prayed for. The warrants were issued for debts incurred by the town during the fiscal year, between April 1, 1928, and
March 31, 1929. The complaint alleged that the town diverted the
funds created for the payment of the indebtedness evidenced by the warrants to other purposes to the damage of the bank in the amount of the
warrants. The defense was a denial of the diversion and upon the
contention that the warrants were invalid, because of lack of power of
the town to incur the indebtedness for which they were issued.
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1. The contention of the town that the proper action was mandamus and not for a general judgment cannot be asserted in the Supreme
Court, where it did not take this position in the lower court by filing
its answer on the merits on other grounds and going to trial thereon
without questioning the form of tnt action.
2. If, as alleged, the funds have been diverted to other uses, then
the money is not there and any attempt by mandamus to -compel payment of these warrants therefrom would be futile. The fund for specific payment must first be available and there must exist a refusal to pay
before mandamus will lie.
3. Where it appears that for the year in question that the levy
made by the town based upon the value of the assessable property would
have produced $5,870.57 if collected in full of which a part was for
special levies, leaving $4,279.79 applicable to general town expense for
the fiscal year and the town issued warrants payable out of the general
fund for $6,646.75 and the full levy was not collected. Out of the
amounts collected $2,027.25 was paid on warrants, leaving a deficiency
on outstanding warrants of $4,619.50, the amount sued for herein.
Such warrants issued in excess of the anticipated revenue from the antecedent tax levy were invalid unless authorized at an election.
4. The town had the right to issue its warrants against the general fund that had existence in fact or law, but not in excess thereof
without the voter's authorization. To issue warrants in excess of revenues without such authorization would be the creation of a debt such
as is prohibited by Section 8, Article II of the State Constitution.
5. In this case, $2,252.54 of the amount of warrants issued all
represents valid obligations of the town, because that amount would not
be beyond the anticipated revenue from the antecedent tax levy. The
last mentioned amount is the difference between the amount possible of
collection and the amount actually collected. This expected amount
against which valid warrants could be issued was a fund having existence in law and if collected would have existence in fact. For payment
of these valid warrants a special or additional levy could be made if not
beyond the limitation imposed by the town charter as amended by
Chapter 94 of the Session Laws of 1919, or if the limitation has not
been reached or the taxing power fully exhausted during the preceding
years, then the reserve or accumulated power may be exercised in one
year by order of court, even though it exceeds the yearly limitation.
6. To recover the above amount, now determined to be a valid
obligation, mandamus to compel a tax levy for its payment is the proper
remedy. The bank is not now entitled to a money judgment, because
there has been no diversion of funds. The fund did not come into
existence in fact and could not be diverted.
7. Even though the town operated under an original special
charter, such charter, with reference to levying taxes, is governed by the
act of the legislature, Chapter 94 of the Session Laws of 1919, entitled
"An Act to Amend the Charter of Georgetown" and thereafter the
town was required to levy taxes in the same manner as provided by the
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general laws of the State of Colorado and are subject to the constitution
of limitations in such matters.
8. The purpose of this limitation is to keep the state substantially on a cash basis, to prohibi2 the pledging of future fixed revenues,
to forbid the contracting of debts which must be paid therefrom and to
make certain that one general assembly shall not paralyze the next by
devouring the available revenues of both.
9. The balance of the amount of the warrants issued is in excess
of the fund anticipated at the time the warrants were issued and is therefore a prohibited debt within the meaning of Section 8, Article 11 of
the Colorado Constitution.-Judgmentreversed.
Mr. Justice Butler, Mr. Justice Bouck and Mr. Justice Young
dissent.
INSURANCE-LIFE--SUICIDE CLAUSE-BURDEN OF PROOF--SUBMISSION TO JURY-The PrudentialInsurance Company of Amer-

ica vs. Cline, as Executor-No. 13578-Decided January 27,
1936--Opinion by Mr. Justice Butler.
The insurance company insured the life of Agnes L. Bjorkman for
$1,000 for the benefit of her husband. The insured died within one
year from the issuance of the policy. Suit was brought by the husband,
the beneficiary. The defense was that the insured committed suicide
within the year. The policy provided, "if within one year from the
date hereof the Insured, whether sane or insane, shall die by suicide, the
liability of the Company shall not exceed the amount of the premiums
paid on this policy." The amount of premiums paid was tendered
back. While the case was pending in the Supreme Court, the beneficiary
died and his executor was substituted.
1. The court below instructed, "Suicide must be proven, and if
you can reconcile the facts of this case upon any reasonable hypothesis,
based upon the evidence, that death of the insured was not caused by
suicide, it is your duty to do so." The correctness of the instruction is
not challenged.
2. If the evidence is such as to exclude all reasonable hypotheses
other than that of suicide, then it was the duty of the trial court to take
the case from the jury.
3. The general and natural presumption is against suicide.
4. Evidence examined and held that the trial court did not err in
refusing the defendant's request to take the case from the jury and direct
the verdict for the defendant. The case was for the jury and their
finding, approved as it was by the trial court, should not and will not
be disturbed.--Judgment affirmed.
Mr. Justice Bouck dissents.
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DIVORCE-ENTRY OF FINAL DECREE-ENTRY AT REQUEST OF Los-

ING PARTY-Kastner vs. Kastner-No. 13738-Decided February

24, 1936--Opinion by Mr. Justice Hilliard.
The court below, after the expiration of one year from the entry
of findings, entered a final decree of divorce at the instance of the losing
party.
1. Under Chapter 71, Session Laws, 1933, where the successful
party to a divorce action has not applied for a final decree of divorce
within one year after the findings are entered, the unsuccessful party is
permitted to apply for a final decree.
2. The constitutionality of the 1933 enactment is not questioned
and the court below had the power to enter the final decree.-Judgment

affirmed.
CRIMINAL LAW-EVIDENCE-ADMISSIBILITY OF CONFESSION OF CO-

DEFENDENT-Miller vs. The People-No. 13663-Decided Feb-

ruary 24, 1936-Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland.
Miller was convicted of larceny and was sentenced to the penitentiary for five to eight years. The information included two other defendants. Miller was granted a separate trial on the ground that one of
the defendants had made a confession certain parts of which had no
bearing on the guilt or innocence of Miller, but would be prejudicial if
tried together. Hammel, one of the other defendants, was first tried
and convicted. The court below admitted the confession of the codefendant, all of which was made out of the presence of Miller.
1. The court erred in admitting the oral confession of Hammel,
one of the defendants, implicating Miller as an accessory before the fact
which was made out of the presence of Miller. This defendant had no
opportunity of cross-examining Hammel, his co-defendant, whereby his
credibility might have been impeached and the jury was deprived not
only of its means of determining the motive or attitude of Hammel but
also of the opportunity to observe his conduct on the witness stand.
2. While statements, confessions and admissions of guilt made
by one of several persons jointly indicted and tried for the same offense
are admissible against the person making them, they are not admissible
against- his co-defendaxnts unless made in their presence and assented to
by them.
3. Where the defendant was an accessory before the fact, only
such parts of the confessions, statements or admissions as would tend to
prove the guilt of the principal could be admitted and not the parts as
would implicate this defendant as an accessory when made out of his
presence and after the commission of the crime.-Judgment reversed.
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TAXATION-PERSONAL PROPERTY OF CHARITABLE INSTITUTIONSEXEMPTIoNS-Koenig, as Treasurer, et al. vs. Jewish Consumptives' Relief Society-No. 13664-Decided February 24, 1936Opinion by Mr. Justice Burke.
The Jewish Consumptives' Relief Society brought injunction to
prohibit the county from taxing its dairy equipment and livestock so
devoted.
A demurrer to the complaint was overruled.
The county
elected to stand and to review the judgment thereupon entered, it prosecutes this writ.
1. Tax exemptions are provided for in Article X of our Constitution. Section 3 thereof exempts "personal property" to the value of
$200 to the head of a family. Section 4 exempts public property, "real
and personal."
Section 5 (so far as here applicable) exempts "Lots,
with buildings thereon, if said buildings are used solely and exclusively
* * * for strictly charitable purposes, * * *" and Section 6 reads: "All
laws exempting from taxation, property other than that hereinbefore
mentioned shall be void."
2. The Constitution does not exempt livestock used solely and
exclusively for charitable purposes. It only exempts lots with the buildings thereon.-Judgmentreversed.
Mr. Chief Justice Campbell not participating, Mr. Justice Holland
dissenting.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-FINDINGS OF COMMISSION-CONCLUSIVENESS-INTERPRETATION OF-Di Greggorio vs. The Monroe
Coal Company, et al.-No. 13889-Decided February 24, 1936
-Opinion by Mr. Justice Burke.
Claimant was employed by the coal company whose insurance,
under the act, was carried with the insurance company. He claimed
disability due to an accident. At the hearing the Commission found
"from the medical testimony" that his disability was due to sub-acute
appendicitis and was neither caused nor aggravated by the accident.
There was a further finding that "This accident occurred on February
25, 1935, claimant left work as a result thereof the same day."
1. Such finding is not a finding of disability caused by the accident such as to oblige cessation of labor. Claimant may well have quit
work as a result of the accident, althought the accident caused no disability whatever. That the Commission did not intend by the language
quoted to find that the accident caused disability is clearly disclosed by
the rest of the findings and the award.
2. Beyond this the record presents a simple case of a finding of
fact by the Commission on conflicting evidence and such finding will
not be disturbed.--Judgment affirmed.
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BILLS AND NOTES-CONDITIONAL DELIVERY-CONFLICTING TESTIMONY-INSTRUCTIONS----Clermenson vs. Bruen-No. 13903-

Decided February 24, 1936--Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland.
At a jury trial of a suit brought by Bruen on a promissory note,
judgment was entered on the verdict against Clemenson, the maker, who
assigns error.
1. Where the defendant alleged and testified that the note that
he executed was delivered conditionally and the plaintiff denied the conditional delivery and testified that there was no conditional delivery,
there was such a conflict in the evidence as required the case to be submitted to the jury.
2. There is sufficient evidence to sustain the verdict.-Judgment

affirmed.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-FINDINGS OF THE COMMISSION-RE-

TROACTIVE AwARD-Roeder, etc., vs. Industrial Commission, et
al.-No. 13770-Decided December 16, 1935--Opinion by Mr.

Justice Hilliard.
1. While the claimant's contention, at the latest hearing, was not
so clear as to remove all doubt, nevertheless, under well established
rules, the finding of the Commission has such a record basis so that the
same will not be disturbed.
2. The entire evidence presented at the hearing had to do with
the claimant's then present condition, and there is no evidence whatsoever as to the claimant's condition in the past. Therefore, the Commission's retroactive award is without basis in the record, and the award
should have been made as of the date of the hearing.-Judgment re-

versed with orders to amend the award as indicated.
INFORMATION - DUPLICITY - Hu m me 1 vs. The
People-No. 13856-Decided December 16, 1935--Opinion by
Mr. Justice Butler.

CRIMINAL LAW-

Defendant was convicted of petty larceny on each of six counts,
each count being a separate, independent and unrelated offense. Defendant filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that it was
bad for duplicity, which motion was overruled. She is now seeking
reversal of the judgment.
1. The information should have been quashed, as it was bad for
duplicity and, in failing to so dispose of the case, the court committed
reversible error.
2. The suggestion that the error was not prejudicial to the de-

fendant is without force.-Judgment is reversed, cause remanded with
direction to quash the information.
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CRIMINAL LAW-INDICTMENTS-MOTION TO QUASH--CONSPIRACY
TO COMMIT BRIBERY-People vs. Wettengel, et al.-No. 13696

-Decided

December 16, 1935--Opinion by Mr. Justice Hilliard.

Wettengel and others were indicted for a conspiracy to commit the
crime of bribery. The indictment charged that Wettengel was to receive the bribe and Blackwell and Utter were to give the bribe. Motion
to quash the indictment was granted in the lower court.
1. There is not, in the law, any such crime as conspiracy to
commit bribery where the conspiracy is charged to and included both
the prospective giver and the prospective receiver.--Judgment affirmed.
Mr. Chief Justice Butler, Mr. Justice Bouck and Mr. Justice
Young dissent.
FORECLOSURE OF DEEDS OF TRUST-COLLATERAL SECURITYJames vs. Ferguson, et al.-No. 13540-Decided December 9,
1935--Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland.
A deed of trust was given on certain lands and water rights by the
owner, who was also the owner of supplemental water rights represented by certificates of stock in two reservoir companies. This stock
was pledged as collateral security with the deed of trust which was subsequently foreclosed on all land and water rights specifically described
therein, the bid being for the full amount due. The trustee's deed
described the land and conveyed all "appurtenances thereunto belonging."
QUESTION: Who owned the water certificates pledged as collateral security?
HELD: The ownership of the collateral security passed with the
foreclosure to the purchaser at the sale and the trustee's deed included
such water stock as appurtenances to the land. These water rights
were necessary to give the land the value necessary to secure the amount
of the loan. This is especially true of the water certificates in this case,
as they describe the land to which they attach.--Judgment affirmed.

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-DECISION OF COMMISSION ON CONFLICTING EVIDENCE-OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE-Schriber-Hartman Decorating Company vs. Barton-No. 13820-Decided
December 9, 1935--Opinion by Mr. Justice Young.
The claimant was engaged for a period of several weeks in painting
the baseboards of a certain building. His knees developed a condition
The Commission denied compensation,
known as "housemaid's knee."
holding that the condition was the result of long continued kneeling
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necessary in the work which the claimant did, and that it was an occupational disease. The District Court made an award to the claimant.
There being evidence to support the findings of the Commission, it was
binding upon the District Court, and the finding by the Commission
determined by necessary inference that the condition from which claimant suffered was not caused by accident.--Judgment reversed.

PLEADING-VARIANCE OF PROOF-The New Mexico Lumber Manu-

facturing Company vs. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Cornpany-No. 13609-Decided December 9, 1935--Opinion by
Mr. Justice Burke.
The sheriff seized under execution certain horses in possession of a
trust company. Trust company demanded possession, which was refused by the sheriff, and thereupon suit was brought against defendant,
as surety on the sheriff's bond. The trust company was a trustee under
a bond issue, and after default took possession, but the horses were not
included in the trust deed. Plaintiff proved an oral pledge of the horses
as additional security for the amount due under the trust deed. The
complaint did not specifically set up the oral pledge, and there was a
fatal variance between pleading and proof.
2. The personal property was located on realty covered by the
trust deed, and notice of the company's possession was posted and notice
referred to the deed of trust as authority for that possession but contained no reference to the oral pledge. This was a fraud on bona fide
creditors or innocent purchasers.--Judgment affirmed.

WATERS-MANDAMUS-RIGHT OF SENIOR RESERVOIR FOR STORAGE
-RIGHT
OF JUNIOR DITCHES FOR DIRECT IRRIGATION-DE-

People on relation of the Park Reservoir Company vs. Hinderlider, et al.-No. 13235-Decided February 3,
1936--Opinion by Mr. Justice Burke.
Parties are in the same position as they are in the Court below.
Plaintiff has a decree for storage water for irrigation of date October
1, 1888. When spring floods had subsided the stream does not furnish
sufficient water for direct irrigation for lands under ditches taking
therefrom. The priorities of some of these antedate that of plaintiff,
MURRER-The

others are subsequent. The total capacity of all exceeds the creek flow.
Defendants, water officials, refused plaintiff the right to store when the
ditches needed the water for direct irrigation, irrespective of the dates
of their priorities. Plaintiff brought mandamus. Defendants demurred
for want of facts and for want of parties. Demurrer sustained.
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1. A senior reservoir may take, for storage, its full appropriation
when a portion of the water is needed by junior ditches for direct irrigation.
. 2. Mandamus was the proper remedy. Where the rights of all
parties have been established by decrees entered in general adjudication
proceedings and the remedy sought by mandamus is simply the enforcement of such judgments by water officials charged therewith, other
water users on the stream need not be made parties.--Judgmentreversed
with directions.
Mr. Justice Butler specially concurring.
TRESPASS-ELEMENTS NECESSARY TO CONSTITUTE A CRIMEWILFULNESS OR INTENT TO DO AN UNLAWFUL ACT-Jones vS.
The People-No. 13861-Decided February 3, 1936--Opinion
by Mr. Justice Holland.
Upon an information charging Jones with trespass, he was tried
and found guilty in the Court below and a fine of $50 imposed.
1. A mere negligent trespass on the lands of another is insufficient
to constitute the crime of trespass.
2. The negligence must be accompanied by a wilful act or
that the trespass involved and intent to do an unlawful act injurious
to another's property.
3. Or the evidence must show that the negligent act was
prompted by hostility, revenge or design. Before a criminal offense in
cases of this character can be established, it must appear that the object
of the act was actual mischief or an intended trespass.
4. In this case the act and injury were incidental to negligence.
-- Judgment reversed.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-NUISANCE-CONTROL OVER BEYOND
CITY LIMITS--St'. Bernard Poultry Farm, Inc., et al. vs. City of
Aurora-No. 13719-Decided February 3, 1936--Opinion by
Mr. Justice Holland.
Plaintiffs in error, applied to the City of Aurora for a permit to
construct, establish and operate a fox farm on lands of the poultry farm
then within the city limits. Application was denied but notwithstanding denial the poultry farm proceeded with preparations and the City of
Aurora applied for and was granted an injunction which was later made
permanent. Thereafter, the lands in question were disconnected from
the city and thereafter the poultry farm filed a petition to vacate the
injunction, because the land was no longer within the city limits and
because the city had no jurisdiction. The Court denied the application.
1. It is not necessary to determine the validity of the original
injunction, because the plaintiff had the power to declare what shall be
a nuisance and abate any such within its corporate limits but power is
not conferred upon it to declare and define what shall constitute a
nuisance within a mile beyond its boundaries.
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2. Where the showing to vacate and dissolve the injunction
demonstrated that the injunctive order then included premises beyond
the city limits, the Court should have sustained the petition and dissolved the injunction.---Judgment reversed.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-FAILURE TO GIVE NOTICE-EXCEPTION TO RULE WHERE COMPENSATION PAID--Morrow vs. In-

dustrial Comrission of Colorado, et al.-No. 13815-Decided
March 2, 1936--Opinion by Mr. Justice Bouch.
Claimant, a school teacher, sustained a compensable injury October
2, 1925, while coaching pupils in their basketball play. She has been
bedridden ever since. No notice of claim was filed by her with the
Industrial Commission until September 28, 1933, almost eight years
after the injury. Her father was principal of the school and after her
injury, with the knowledge of the board, employed a substitute teacher
for $100 a month. Claimant's salary had been $125 a month and she
was paid the difference of $25.
The commission denied her claim,
which was affirmed by the District Court.
1. The claimant was required to file a notice claiming compensation with the Industrial Commission within six months after the injury,
but there is an exception to this rule in that this limitation does not
apply to any claimant to whom compensation has been paid.
2. It was the duty of the school board, as the employer, to give
notice of the injury to the Industrial Commission within ten days after
the injury. This the school board failed to do.
3. The claimant had no.knowledge from any source that it was
necessary for her to give notice of claim.
4. The $25 that was paid to the claimant after she was injured
and could perform no part of her contract as a teacher brings this case
within the exception that no notice need be filed by the claimant within
six months where compensation has been paid.
5. The original opinion, which read for affirmance, is withdrawn
and the present opinion is substituted therefor.--Judgmentreversed.
Mr. Justice Holland dissents.
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